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The upside in your model came from the playbook, not the practice

April 2026

Most acquisition teams modeling upside on a dental practice are working from the same assumption, which is that their integration playbook will deliver roughly what it has on previous deals, and that the gap between what the practice currently produces and what it could produce will close on a predictable timeline. For groups that have done this enough times to have real data behind that assumption, it's been defensible. The averages held and the playbook worked, so going deeper into each individual practice before close didn't feel necessary because the outcomes were fine even without it.

But that assumption is becoming harder to defend. Multiple compression, a higher cost of capital, and PE ownership structures that demand faster and more measurable value creation have made the gap between a deal that performs to model and one that doesn't way more consequential than it was just a few years ago. Delayed recovery timelines don't just shift IRR curves, they consume the capital and bandwidth that should be going into the next acquisition, and in a market where deployment pace matters as much as deal quality, a portfolio carrying meaningful underperformers is a harder story to tell to the people who funded it.

The reason those underperformers so often look like surprises is that the information that would have predicted them was never part of the diligence. Six to twelve months post-close, when the numbers come in short and the board is asking why, the answer is almost always the same: the practice wasn't what the model assumed it was, and there was no way to know that without looking at data nobody looked at before close. Not the financial statements, not the seller's summary reports, but the actual patient-level picture inside the practice management system that shows the lapsed patients, the accepted treatments that were never converted, what the providers are producing relative to each other, and the why behind the variance. That picture can exist before the deal closes, it just isn't currently part of the diligence process because nobody has built the product that produces it for a deal room. Which means every group doing acquisitions right now and the banks underwriting them are running the same blind spot into their deals and excusing the underperformers as bad luck or difficult post-close integration when it's actually neither.

The groups that start acquiring with this level of pre-close clarity first will be pricing deals with a level of certainty nobody else in the market has right now, building more defensible investment theses, and capturing upside their peers won't even know they missed.

Originally published on LinkedIn →